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NOTES AND COMMENTS
capias, an exigent, five exactions at five consecutive county courts,
and a proclamation at the door of a place for divine worship were
required before an outlawry could be incurred. North Carolina's
outlawry is less sanguinary, but the procedure is dangerously sim-
ple.6
3
Nothing remains of the social order for which outlawry was
fashioned. A re-evaluation of this archaic statute is recommended
before any irreparable injustice occurs which could reflect upon the
dignity of the laws of North Carolina.
BOBBY G. DEAVER
Pleadings-Material and Immaterial Variance
In Hall v. Poteat1 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negli-
gently drove his automobile, without lights, from the right shoulder
of the highway into the path of the plaintiff's oncoming automobile.
It was further alleged that this occurred so suddenly that it was
impossible for the plaintiff to avoid a collision. On trial the plaintiff's
testimony tended to show that the defendant's automobile was
stopped, without lights, in the plaintiff's lane of travel when the
collision occurred. No objection to the introduction of this evidence
was made by the defendant. On motion, the trial court granted a
judgment of involuntary nonsuit. On appeal, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, although conceding that the plaintiff's testimony
was sufficient to support a finding of negligence on the part of the
defendant,' held that the variance between the plaintiff's allegations
and proof was material, and thus fatal. Accordingly the judgment of
nonsuit was affirmed.
Variance occurs when the proof does not conform to the case
pleaded. North Carolina, like most code jurisdictions,8 has by
statute set out three degrees of deviation of facts proved from facts
pleaded." As a literal reading of these statutes seems plainly to
"3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-48 (1950).
'257 N.C. 458, 125 S.E.2d 924 (1962).
2 257 N.C. at 463, 125 S.E.2d at 928.
' See CLARI, CODE PLEADING § 120 (2d ed. 1947).
"The first two degrees are defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-168 (1953):
"1. No variance between the allegation in a pleading and the proof shall be
deemed material, unless it has actually misled the adverse party to his preju-
dice in maintaining his action upon the merits. Whenever it is alleged that
a party has been so misled, that fact and in what respect he has been misled
must be proved to the satisfaction of the court; and thereupon the judge may
order the pleading to be amended upon such terms as shall be just. 2. Where
the variance is not material as herein provided, the judge may direct the fact
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contemplate, and indeed, as our court consistently construed them'
until the fairly recent past, the overall statutory purpose is to work
increasingly severe consequences, ranging from mere momentary
interruption to nonsuit, upon a plaintiff whose proof varies from
his pleading as the degree of deviation increases. Thus the slight-
est degree, an immaterial variance, is to be disregarded.' Next,
when a variance is so great as to be prejudicially misleading to the
defendant, it is deemed material and requires an amendment. But
a defendant, in order to avail himself of this remedial action, must
in apt time raise the point and satisfy the trial court that the vari-
ance is material under the prejudicially misleading test." If he
fails seasonably to raise the point, he impliedly consents to litigat-
ing the issues on the proof offered. The variance, though possibly
"material" under the test, is "deemed immaterial" by the failure of
the defendant in apt time to suggest its prejudicially misleading
to be found according to the evidence, or may order an immediate amendment
without costs." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-169 (1953) defines the third degree:
"Where the allegation of the cause of action or defense to which the proof is
directed is unproved, not in some particular or particulars only, but in its
entire scope and meaning, it is not deemed a case of variance, but a failure of
proof." Thus, there is under this scheme no "fatal" variance.
See Simmons v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 174 N.C. 220, 93 S.E. 736
(1917); Brown v. Western Union Tel. Co., 169 N.C. 509, 86 S.E. 290
(1915) ; Green v. Biggs, 167 N.C. 417, 83 S.E. 553 (1914) ; Wright v. In-
surance Co., 138 N.C. 488, 51 S.E. 55 (1905). For a complete and thorough
discussion of the construction and application of the variance statutes as con-
strued previously see Justice Seawell's dissent in Whichard v. Lipe, 221 N.C.
55, 19 S.E.2d 15 (1942).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-168(2) (1953). As an alternative to disregarding
the variance the trial court may order an immediate amendment. Ibid. It
would appear that in deciding whether or not a variance is to be deemed
immaterial the trial judge must ascertain two things. The first is whether or
not the plaintiff has actually varied from the facts that he has pleaded and
second, if he has, is the variance less than as described as material, i.e., preju-
dicially misleading under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-168(1) (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-168(1) (1953). Chief Justice Clark, concurring
in Wright v. Insurance Co., 138 N.C. 488, 495-96, 51 S.E. 55, 58 (1905),
stated that "this section [G.S. § 1-168] further provides that the adverse
party must allege that he was misled, and must prove that fact 'to the satis-
faction of the court' and wherein he was misled, and the only penalty and
remedy prescribed is an amendment upon such terms as the court may deem
just. There is no penalty allowed of dismissal of the action or loss of sub-
stantial rights by either party. The sole object is that the cause shall be tried
and decided upon its merits. Here the defendant did not allege that he was
misled .... Had he done so, justice and the statute prescribed as the sole
remedy an amendment upon such terms as the court might deem just. The
court could not visit upon the plaintiff, as a penalty for inadvertence in
pleading, or a mistaken allegation of fact (if made) a dismissal of the action."
[Vol. 41
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quality to the court.' If the point is raised and it is decided that
the variance is material the court is obligated to protect the defend-
ant from this heretofore unexpected offer of proof by granting a
continuance so that he may adequately prepare to counter it.9 Thus,
a material variance under the statutory scheme is not such a drastic
failure of proof as to justify nonsuit, this final penalty being re-
served for the ultimate degree of deviation, which is denominated a
"total failure of proof."' 0  The obvious occasion for applying this
last label and imposing this penalty occurs when the plaintiff at-
tempts to prove a cause of action entirely different from that which
was alleged."
That adherence to any scheme involving such conceptually
elusive gradations will present difficult problems 2 of analysis from
8E.g., Simmons v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 174 N.C. 220, 93 S.E.
736 (1917). It follows also that once the point is raised on trial the trial
judge's finding that the variance is immaterial is binding unless there is an
abuse of discretion. See Dellinger v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., 160 N.C. 532, 76
S.E. 494 (1912), where a variance was deemed immaterial, the supreme
court resting part of its decision on the fact that the trial judge had deemed
it such on objection by the defendant.
'Where there has been some change made in the nature of the action by
an amendment adding new allegations and such change materially affects
the rights of the adverse party, he is entitled to a continuance as a matter of
right. Nassaney v. Culler, 224 N.C. 323, 30 S.E.2d 226 (1944).
°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-169 (1953).
"' Smith v. Cook, 196 N.C. 558, 146 S.E. 229 (1929); Talley v. Harriss
Granite Quarries Co., 174 N.C. 445, 93 S.E. 995 (1917); Hunt v. Vanderbilt,
115 N.C. 559, 20 S.E. 168 (1894). Adherence to this statutory pattern ob-
viously requires recognition of a degree of variance lying between the merely
immaterial and the total failure of proof which constitute the extremes of
the scheme of deviation. Since this intermediate stage necessarily contem-
plates some substantial degree of deviation, this deviation must occur with
respect to factual detail within the various "ultimate facts" making up a
particular cause of action. "Total failure of proof" must then mean a failure
to introduce any evidence more than a scintilla in respect of any particular
essential element in the cause of action, rather than a mere variance from"evidentiary" fact pleaded in specifying facts presumably beyond the actual
requirements of the pleading. This is borne out by the fact that the court
has held a "total failure of proof" not only to occur when the plaintiff proves
or attempts to prove a different cause of action, cases cited supra, but also
when the plaintiff fails to produce enough evidence to substantiate that which
he has pleaded. See, e.g., McCoy v. Railroad, 142 N.C. 383, 55 S.E. 270
(1906). Justice Seawell made such a conceptual analysis, stating that "it
has been considered as axiomatic that a difference between the allegations of
a complaint and the evidence adduced to support them does not constitute a
material variance unless there is a substantial departure in the evidence
from the issues upon which the cause of action depends." Whichard v. Lipe,
221 N.C. 53, 56, 19 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1942) (dissent).
" These problems, though, are no more difficult than those closely re-
lated ones constantly faced in determining whether the plaintiff has suc-
19631
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case to case is obvious, but the scheme seems plain. Furthermore,
it makes sense in terms of trial convenience. It contemplates that
a defendant must signify such discomfiture as he may feel from
unexpected proof immediately as he feels it. This is certainly no
particular hardship, and it allows the trial court to make an imme-
diate appraisal of the probable extent of the defendant's inability
by virtue of surprise to counter the offered proof. This is pre-
sumably to be done on the basis of a practical appraisal of the
extent to which any investigation of facts reasonably prompted by
the "ultimate facts" pleaded would necessarily have prepared him
to counter the evidence now offered. Thus the notice-giving func-
tion of pleadings can adequately be policed at a stage of trial and
under conditions which protect both parties against unjustifiable
results in terms of the ultimate merits of the case. If the case he
has attempted to prove is within reasonable limits, the plaintiff is
protected against a dismissal. The defendant, on the other hand,
by having the right to a continuance is given adequate opportunity
to prepare to meet the now questioned proof. Thus the ultimate
result is that under this scheme a case may fairly be tried on its
merits in one action. 3
As indicated, our court for many years consistently maintained
the integrity of this statutory scheme. 4 But with Whichard v.
Lipe'3 decided in 1942, the court, by reversing a judgment for the
plaintiff on the basis of a "material variance" although there had
ceeded in alleging a cause of action and deciding whether facts pleaded are
"ultimate," "evidentiary," or "conclusions of law."
"SAs stated by Justice Seawell, dissenting in Whichard v. Lipe, 221
N.C. 53, 58, 19 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1942), "the purpose of our own and similar
statutes is to prevent cases from being thrown out of court upon the tech-
nicalities so favored by the common law and to enable courts of justice,
when once their jurisdiction has attached, to reach their objectives without
frustration and without the added expense and vexation of being compelled
to march out of court and back again upon a matter not vital or determina-
tive of the controversy." See also note 7 supra quoting from Wright v.
Insurance Co., 138 N.C. 489, 51 S.E. 55 (1905).
' See notes 5-8 & 11 supra. In the earlier cases there appears to have
been only one case that definitely failed to adhere to the statutory scheme.
See Abernathy v. Seagle, 98 N.C. 553, 4 S.E. 542 (1887).
-5221 N.C. 53, 19 S.E.2d 14 (1942). The action was brought against
the owner of a truck alleging liability in tort under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior. In her complaint the plaintiff alleged the identity of the
driver. On trial she failed to prove his identity, introducing instead evi-
dence tending to show that some agent was driving the truck. The defend-
ant failed to object to the presentation of this evidence. Motion to nonsuit
was denied, and a judgment was rendered for plaintiff. On appeal the
Supreme Court reversed on the grounds of a "material variance."
(Vol. 41
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been no objection during trial by the defendant to the evidence
presented, introduced a new approach of which the instant case is
the most recent example. Despite Justice Seawell's dissent point-
ing out the drastic nature of the departure and the virtues of the
scheme abandoned,' 6 the court has used this decision as precedent
in a new line of cases' 7 which in effect equates that degree of vari-
ance which formerly could be deemed "material" only if properly
objected to by the defendant during trial, with that which had
previously been considered a "total failure of proof." The result
is that any variance that is found to be "material," is flatly dubbed
"fatal,"" with the consequence that a defendant need no longer
" 221 N.C. 55, 19 S.E.2d 15. It is also interesting to note that Justice
Seawell, after describing the statutory variance scheme and its application,
stated that even with all that he had said previously "there are many cases
in the books which, under our modern liberal practice, lead to the conclusion
that the variance here is immaterial." 221 N.C. at 58, 19 S.E.2d at 17. With
this statement as a starting point a study of the cases that have followed
indicates that this decision not only changed the court's attitude as to the
consequences of "material variance" but also restricted its view as to the
nature of immaterial variances. Compare Dellinger v. Charlotte Elec. Ry.,
160 N.C. 532, 76 S.E. 494 (1912), and Wright v. Insurance Co., 138 N.C.
488, 51 S.E. 55 (1905), with Lucas v. White, 248 N.C. 38, 102 S.E.2d 387
(1958) and Messick v. Turnage, 240 N.C. 625, 83 S.E.2d 654 (1954).
There are decisions seemingly applying a liberal view of immaterial vari-
ance, e.g., Rick v. Murphey, 251 N.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 815 (1959), but
looking at the cases in their sum total many decisions have been appealed
since Whichard that previously would not have been considered by defend-
ants' attorneys as giving grounds for hope that the court would find "mate-
rial variance." Thus what realistically is no variance at all is sometimes
spoken of as being an immaterial variance. See, e.g., Krider v. Martelle,
252 N.C. 474, 113 S.E.2d 924 (1960). It is also interesting to note that
terms such as "proof without allegation is as unavailing as allegation with-
out proof" and "the plaintiff must make out his case secunduio allegata"
which now abound in the new line of decisions, cases cited note 17 infra and
which form a basis for nonsuit on the grounds of a "material variance," e.g.,
Messick v. Turnage, supra, were formerly used only when the deviation
amounted to a total failure of proof. E.g., McCoy v. Railroad, 142 N.C.
383, 55 S.E. 270 (1906).
"' Vickers v. Russell, 253 N.C. 394, 117 S.E.2d 45 (1960); Moore v.
Singleton, 249 N.C. 287, 106 S.E.2d 214 (1958); Lucas v. White, 248 N.C.
38, 102 S.E.2d 387 (1958); Wilkes Poultry Co. v. Clark Trailer & Equip.
Co., 247 N.C. 570, 101 S.E.2d 458 (1958); Andrews v. Bruton, 242 N.C.
93, 86 S.E.2d 786 (1955); Brady v. Nehi Beverage Co., 242 N.C, 32, 86
S.E.2d 901 (1955); Messick v. Turnage, 240 N.C. 625, 83 S.E.2d 654
(1954); Wilkins v. Commerce Fin. Co., 237 N.C. 396, 75 S.E.2d 118
(1953) ; Smith v. Barnes, 236 N.C. 176, 72 S.E.2d 216 (1952) ; Bowen v.
Darden, 233 N.C. 443, 64 S.E.2d 285 (1951); Suggs v. Braxton, 227 N.C.
50, 40 S.E.2d 470 (1946).
"A fatal variance between allegation and proof usually results in a dis-
missal of the proceedings, as this amounts to a total failure of proof on the
declaration of the cause alleged. Stafford v. Yale, 228 N.C. 220, 222, 44
S.E.2d 872, 873 (1947). (Emphasis added.) A material variance is "fatal."
1963]
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suggest seasonably to the trial court that he has been misled to his
prejudice by the plaintiff's offer of proof. Now he can with im-
punity fail to note any surprise felt, fail to object to the evidence,
and take advantage of the discovered "material variance" by motion
for nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff's case. With few excep-
tions"9 this approach is now well settled in our decisions.
As a result there is now understandably a premium placed on
prolixity of pleadings and on undue pleading of various alternative
evidentiary factual theories2" as plaintiffs seek to protect themselves
against the exigencies of trial developments which may find them
nonsuited on the basis of a fairly minor deviation of exact fact
proved from exact fact pleaded.21 Furthermore, since a nonsuited
E.g., Hall v. Poteat, 257 N.C. 458, 461, 125 S.E.2d 924, 927 (1962). Thus,
in the earlier cases following Whichard the court felt some qualms about
placing a "material variance" in the same category as a "total failure of
proof." Although the result is now the same, the distinction in labels has
now at last been abandoned.
" Zager v. Setzer, 242 N.C. 493, 88 S.E.2d 94 (1955) ; Spivey v. New-
man, 232 N.C. 281, 59 S.E.2d 844 (1950). Both of these cases at first
reading appear to reiterate the rule prior to Whichard but are easily dis-
tinguishable on the basis that the supreme court decides that in both of
these cases there was not a "material variance" because it did not find that
the defendant was materially prejudiced. Thus the court on its own now
decides whether or not there was a "material variance." Under the old rule
the burden was placed on the defendant to show by objection that he was
being prejudiced by the introduction of certain evidence. See notes 7 & 8
and accompanying text. See also Chappell v. Winslow, 258 N.C. 617, 129
S.E.2d 101 (1963); Martin Flying Service, Inc. v. Martin, 233 N.C. 17, 62
S.E.2d 528 (1958).
2As demonstrated by the principal case a mistake in pleading a small
evidentiary fact can lead to the dire consequence of a material variance.
Thus the attorney, attempting to plead a cause of action grounded on negli-
gence, for example, is placed in difficult straits; especially if he is not certain
of all the details of his client's case. There appear two alternatives. The
first is to plead "ultimate facts" thus leaving a greater leeway for acceptable
deviation. Although this technique was used successfully in at least one
case, Rick v. Murphey, 251 N.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 815 (1959), the pleader
risks the more than likely prospect of having his complaint demurred to
successfully either prior to trial or ore tenus in the Supreme Court since
the court is stringent in requiring the pleader to allege in his complaint with
great particularity the acts or omissions giving rise to the cause of action.
E.g., Tysinger v. Coble Dairy Prod., 225 N.C. 717, 36 S.E.2d 246 (1945).
Thus, choosing the lesser of two evils the cautious pleader should choose to
plead with prolixity, alleging all that did or could have happened. By fol-
lowing this procedure the plaintiff is safe for "it is sufficient to impose liabil-
ity to establish any one of the negligent acts enumerated in the complaint
which proximately results in the damage charged." Krider v. Martello,
252 N.C. 474, 475, 113 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
" As noted previously the negligence action gives rise to the greatest
difficulties for the unwary pleader. Perfect examples of the great restrictions
placed upon the pleader are supplied by the cases arising out of automobile
[Vol. 41
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plaintiff may always commence again, 2 the nonsuit actually ac-
complishes nothing in terms of remedying the immediate problem
of variance that a continuance under the law as formerly applied
would not do. It merely adds further expense since the plaintiff
now has to commence a new action rather than simply seeing that
the case is put back on the trial calendar after the time allowed
defendant in the continuance order has expired.
For the foregoing reasons it would appear that the pre-Which-
ard application of our statutory variance scheme was much pref-
erable to that which is presently applied. Reappraisal by the court
to reinstate authority of the earlier line of cases would seem to be
in order. Another possibility would be for the General Assembly
to enact a "litigation by consent" type of statute which, avoiding
outright the troublesome variance conceptions, would approach the
problem in head-on fashion.23
GEORGE C. COCHRAN
collisions. The principle case does not stand alone in finding a "material
variance" for slight variations of fact proved from fact pleaded. In Lucas
v. White, 248 N.C. 38, 102 S.E.2d 387 (1955) the plaintiff alleged that prior
to the collision between his automobile and that of the defendant's, the de-
fendant's car was "wobbling." On trial the evidence showed that the defend-
ant's car proceeded in a straight line to the point of impact. The court held
that this was a "material variance." See also Brady v. Nehi Beverage Co.,
242 N.C. 32, 86 S.E.2d 901 (1955). The ultimate in granting a nonsuit on
the basis of failure of the plaintiff to prove exactly that which he had alleged
is Messick v. Turnage, 240 N.C. 625, 83 S.E.2d 654 (1954). In that case the
plaintiff sued for injuries arising when plaster fell from the ceiling of the
defendant's theatre. A nonsuit was affirmed by the supreme court when it
was found that the falling plaster was due to a leaking bathroom rather
than from rainwater seeping through the roof as alleged.
.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-25 (1953) reads in part: "If an action is com-
menced within the time prescribed therefore, and the plaintiff is nonsuited...
the plaintiff... may commence a new action within one year after such
nonsuit...."
. "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or im-
plied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings." FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
1963]
